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The objective of this paper is to develop a model that explains the involvement of rst level handlers
in farm level decisions. In particular, the research attempts to explain observed dierences among
levels of farmer's autonomy in production contracts of dierent agricultural commodities. We show
that the trade o that a contractor faces for holding the decision rights for controlling production
inputs varies for dierent production environments. In particular, the contractor prefers controlling
inputs in production of commodities that have relatively uniform production environments, whereas it
is more ecient to delegate the control to the producer for commodities that have diverse production
environments.
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The use of agricultural production contracts in agricultural commodity markets has grown rapidly in
recent years. In 2003, the share of all agricultural commodities produced under production contracts
was 17.5 percent, up from 12 percent in early 1990s. Production contracts are more prevalent in
livestock markets than in crop markets. In 2003, the production shares of livestock produced under
contracts were 88 percent for poultry and eggs, 50 percent for hogs and 25 percent for cattle. These
correspond to a 5 percentage point increase in poultry and eggs, a 20 percentage point increase in
hogs and a 10 percentage point increase in cattle production under contract compared to their levels
in early 1990s (MacDonald and Korb, 2006).
The growing importance of the agricultural production contracts has led researchers and policy-
makers to study the extent and consequences of contracting. Some previous studies have examined
the eects of contracting on production chain and distribution of benets, while others focused on the
forces that explain the design of the contracts. This study adds to the latter genre of studies focusing on
contractor control of some inputs. Processor (principal, contractor, integrator), henceforth principal,
control of inputs is a controversial feature of agricultural production contracts. In a recent article,
Hueth et. al. (2007) points out the research needs to better understand this feature: "`Although the
farm is often treated as an autonomous decision-making unit, rst-level handlers are clearly involved to
some extent in decisions that farmers make. What purpose does this involvement serve?"' (p. 1280).
Previous studies on agricultural production contracts have mostly focused on risk{shifting aspects
of contracting. In general, these studies have pointed out the tradeo between risk and expected
return in contracts and have concluded that the primary force behind contractual arrangements is risk
reduction (e.g. Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; Johnson and Foster, 1994).
Gillespie and Eidman (1998) argued that risk itself does not completely explain why a producer
might accept a contract. By assessing the hog production contracts in a multi-attribute (income and
autonomy) framework they found that autonomy is a signicant aspect of contracts and overlooking
autonomy might underestimate the price to attract the independent producers. However, the study
does not establish an economic rationale to why farmers desire to maintain autonomy.
While abovementioned studies describe advantages and disadvantages of contracting they do not
1focus on the forces that form the design of contracts. Goodhue (1999), on the other hand, provides
informal discussions of the motivations behind processor control of inputs, suggesting that processors
might prefer input control for planning purposes to reduce production costs. For example, control
over the timing harvest might be important for scheduling deliveries from many farmers. Another
motivation might be controlling input in attempt to preserve intellectual property rights. In some
agricultural commodities processors undertake substantial amount of investment in genetic improve-
ments (e.g, soybean seed, chicks). Therefore, instead of selling the input to farmers the processor
might contract for production while holding the property rights of the input. Lastly, input control can
be eective in achieving the processor's desired quality level of nal product. While these motivations
explain the implicit tradeos for processor and their involvement in input control, they do not explain
the incentives for farmers to cede control.
In another study, Goodhue (2000) provides a formal discussion of input controls in broiler industry.
The study employs a multi-agent multi-task framework to solve for the combined hidden action and
hidden information that the processor faces. Goodhue (2000) nds that the economic rationale in pro-
cessor control of inputs is the reduced information rents that must be paid to high productivity agents.
Implicit in this result is that farmers desire their autonomy in order to maintain their information
rents. A signicant restriction of this model is that it assumes the decisions are ex ante contractible.
However, in actual contracts we observe that it is the decision rights that are contractible but not the
decisions. For example, a broiler contract does not specify actual quantity and the quality of the feed
that should be used; instead it gives decision right to the processor.
An environment in which decision rights are contractible ex ante but not the decisions can be
analyzed by using adaptation theory (Gibbons, 2005; Baker et.al., 2002). The previous studies on
agricultural contracts have not employed adaptation theory to explore the forces that govern the
contract design. In adaptation theory the central issue is the control and it does not involve ex ante
incentives. Conversely, in incentive systems theory the central issue is ex ante incentives and it does
not involve control. However actual agricultural production contracts involve aspects of both control
and ex ante incentives. Therefore, we developed a hybrid model based on these two frameworks to
be able to explain why we observe dierent levels of farmer's autonomy in production contracts of
dierent agricultural commodities..
2Authority Model of Input Controls
We develop a theoretical model of agricultural production contracts that provides an economic expla-
nation of input control by blending some features of both incentive systems and adaptation theories.
The developed hybrid model depicts the complex nature of agricultural production contracts that
species authority for some input decisions while provides incentives for other inputs. Authority is
specied for inputs that are dicult to contract on ex ante 1 (e.g. quality of feed). Whereas, incentive
schemes are used for some other inputs that are not observable but contractible through a performance
measure such as output (e.g. grower eort).
Another feature of the model is that it allows for dierent degrees of heterogeneity of production
environments across farm industries. A higher the degree of heterogeneity in production environment
implies higher variations in productivity and type of inputs used. For example, wheat producers might
face dierent soil conditions and/or might use dierent so that they have higher variations in type
and productivity of inputs like seed and fertilizer. On the other hand, swine producers are likely to
have similar type of housing or breed of livestock so that they might have less variation in type and
productivity of inputs such as feed. In this model we assume that farmers within an industry are
homogeneous in ability and relate the observed dierences in their performance to the heterogeneity
of production environment.
The production function is specied as:
(1) yi = f(e;Q(i))
where i indexes on farm industries (i.e. Cattle, broiler, wheat), y is output, e is eort and Q is a
composite non-eort input. Non{contractability of Q might arise, for example, from innovation. Since
innovation is continuous in time, whereas contracts are discrete, at the time of the negotiation parties
might be uncertain of the best type of input to be used in production. Therefore, they would prefer
to assign decision rights rather than to administer the input directly in the contract. We introduce a
technology parameter i which is related to Q but not e. i is a random variable and composed of
1It is assumed that decision rights are not negotiable ex post.
3a constant, i, that is common to all agents and an idiosyncratic part, il, that varies across agents,
l = 1;:::;m, within industry i:
(2) i = ii + (1   i)il 8i 2 [0;1]
where i measures the degree of homogeneity of production across agents within industry i that is
known to both parties.
Composite input is not contractible and its ex ante total cost is unknown to both parties. However,
both parties can gather information on i to nd out the optimal Q. Cost of information on constant
i is same for both parties and denoted by constant ci. However, the principal is assumed to have
the advantage of splitting the cost across m agents with whom she has a contract. Information on
il, on the other hand, is assumed to be less costly for the agent due to his advantage in learning his




i for agent and principal, respectively, where sa
i < s
p
i 8 i 2 (1;:::;n).
The payos for the agent and principal, respectively, without considering who bears the cost of
composite input and search are given by Ua(yi;d) = w(yi)   c(e) and Up(yi;d) = yi   w(yi). Where
w(yi) is transfer function, c(e) is a convex cost function of eort and d denotes the decision on
composite input use. The timing of the model is as following:
 Parties negotiate governance structure: both control and contract.
 Parties exert eort and gather information on production technology.
 the controlling party makes a chooses the non{eort input.
 production occurs and payos are realized.
The optimal contract can be solved by using backward induction. Accordingly, in the third stage
the party who has the control makes a decision that maximizes his/her expected utility:
(3) maxdEyi(Uj(yi;dj(yi))) 8j 2 (a;p):
Then the payo to the party without control is given by Eyi(Uk(yi;dj(yi))) j 6= k. The decision right
4in negotiation stage is then given to the party whose decision provides the highest expected total
surplus.
(4) TSj = Eyi(Up(yi;dj(yi)) + Ua(yi;dj(yi))) 8j 2 (a;p):
Optimal contract when eort is observable
Under symmetric information principal can observe eort. First consider the case where the control
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a is the optimal quality of composite input for agent and r is the constant cost of the composite
input. The agent determines Q
a according to the following program:
maxQEUa(w(yi)   c(e)   rQ   c   sa
i):
Therefore, unlike conventional principal-agent problems under symmetric information, the rst stage
problem for the principal is constrained by the agent's maximization problem. This constraint is
much like a conventional incentive compatibility constraint, (IC), under moral hazard. In moral
hazard models principal provides incentives to the agent to achieve optimal eort. However, in this
case principal provides incentives to achieve optimal search of information on Q. In the following,
we refer to this constraint as IC bearing in mind its dierence from conventional IC. Therefore, the
program for the principal's problem that consists of IC and participation constraint, PC, is given by:
maxe;Q;w EUp(yi   w(yi))
s:t
EUa(w(yi)   c(e)   rQ   c   sa
i)   ua (PC)
Q 2 argmaxQEUa(w(yi)   c(e)   rQ   c   sa
i) (IC):
5The lagrangian is:
LQ;e;w = EUp(:) + (EUa    ua) + (@EUa=@Q):
The rst order conditions are:
LQ = @EUp=@Q + @EUa=@Q + (@2EUa=@Q2) (5)
Le = @EUp=@e + @EUa=@e + (@2EUa=@Q@e) (6)
Lw = @EUp=@w + @EUa=@w + (@2EUa=@Q@w): (7)
Note that the second term in equation (5) drops out due to the FOC condition of the IC constraint.
Similarly, the second term in equation (6) drops out since principal can restrict e to its optimum such
that RTSeQ = c0(e)=r. This results in an input combination that minimizes production costs, however
the principal pays information costs associated with eliciting the optimum amount of search costs
needed for the employment of ecient amount of composite input. Since the participation constraint
holds with equality, the information costs are equal to the disutility of search costs to the agent.
Now consider the case where the control is given to principal. The payos for the agent and the














p is the optimal quality of composite input for principal. The principal determines Q
p accord-
ing to the following program:
maxQEUp(yi   w(yi)   rQ   c=m   s
p
i):
6Then the optimum contract is the solution to the following program:




EUa(w(yi)   c(e))   ua (PC)
Q 2 argmaxQEUp(yi   w(yi)   rQ   c=m   s
p
i):
Note that the principal's third stage problem serves as an IC constraint in the rst stage. Assuming
that the production functions are identical for both parties2, the solution for this program is the input
combination of (e, Q) that are identical to the previous case. However, in this case, the principal
incurs his disutility of search for information instead of paying information rents that compensates the
disutility of the agent's search of information. Assuming identical utility functions for both parties,
the party that incurs lower search costs provides higher total surplus by holding the authority.
Proposition 1: In the benchmark case (symmetric information) learning costs of production
technology is the sole determinant of the allocation of authority.
Corollary: In highly homogeneous (heterogeneous) production environments the principal (agent) is
able to increase the total surplus by controlling the input.
2This requires that both parties nd out identical density function z(Q) after their search.
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